Today's business model for hardware designs frequently incorporates third-party Intellectual Property (IP) mainly due to economic motivations. However, allowing thirdparty involvement also increases the possibility of malicious attacks, such as hardware Trojan insertion, which is a particularly dangerous security threat because functional testing can often leave the Trojan undetected. This research provides an improvement on a Trojan detection method and tool known as Structural Checking which analyzes Register-Transfer Level (RTL) soft IPs. Given an unknown IP, the tool will break down the design and label ports and signals with assets. Analyzing the asset patterns reveals how the IP is structured and provides information about its overall functionality. The tool incorporates a library of known designs referred to as the Golden Reference Library (GRL). All entries in the library, grouped into known-clean and know-infested, are analyzed in the same manner. A weighted percent match for each library entry against the unknown IP is calculated. A report is generated detailing all mismatched locations where users need to take a closer look. Due to the structural variability of soft IP designs, it is vital to provide the best possible weighting to best match the unknown IP to the most similar library entry. This paper provides a statistical approach to finding the best weights to optimize the tool's matching algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the growing use of third-party hardware IPs worldwide, the importance of securing hardware designs has grown significantly. By outsourcing components of a hardware design to other parties, the integrity of the overall design can be compromised. One example of this is the insertion of a hardware Trojan into a 3 rd party component. Trojan-infested components often work as intended most of the time to hide the Trojan. Consequently, hardware Trojans are difficult to detect which leads to damaging payloads, including leaking a secret key and shutting down a part of the hardware during operation. Any compromised design can then end up in applications where security is vital, such as defense applications. As a result, developing a method for hardware Trojan detection is very important to guarantee the integrity of all hardware.
A significant area of research for hardware Trojan detection comes from side-channel analysis. Side-channel analysis takes advantage of naturally occurring emissions of a circuit, such as power and timing delays, to detect modifications to the circuit. A drawback from this approach is that Trojans can be very small and thus do not produce significant emission to raise concerns. Introduced in [1] , different circuits are first partitioned and then power analysis is performed. By observing the circuit in smaller portions, the difference in power readings is more significant.
Path delay [2] seeks to find significant differences in how long a signal takes to travel through a specific path within the circuit. However, similar to power analysis, the Trojan inserted may not be very large which means that path delays alone may not be enough to indicate an inserted Trojan. While power and timing analysis are valid methods of Trojan detection, they both focus on detecting Trojans on hard IPs, or fabricated chips. Even with correct detection, the infested chips are still unreliable. There is a need for Trojan detection in earlier stages of design flow.
Hardware Trojan detection for soft IPs includes Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code and gate-level netlists. Methods like these can be used in conjunction with functional testing and mitigation techniques for Hardware Trojans in hard IPs to ensure that both structural and functional Trojans are found. In [3] , hardware Trojans are detected in gate-level netlists using a Random Forest Classifier. Another machine learning technique is through a support vector machine classifier [4] . It breaks down each net into 5 characteristics and classifies each net as either Trojan-infested or Trojan-free, based on known knowledge. Golden Reference Matching for Trojan detection is introduced in [5] , which breaks down an RTL code by labeling primary ports and internal signals with assets, the signals' contribution to the overall design. Upon completion of assigning assets, an unknown IP is compared against the Golden Reference Library, a collection of soft IPs that are known to be either clean or Trojan-infested. If the unknown IP matches best with a Trojaninfested library entry then the unknown IP is likely to contain a Trojan, and vice versa. Building on the work of [5] , [6] extends it to gate-level netlists.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section II will briefly cover background information on assets, Structural Checking, and the process of Golden Reference Matching. Section III will explain the design and implementation of statistical based improvements on the matching algorithm. Section IV provides sample results and analysis. Section V will conclude the paper and provide details on future work.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Assetss
1) Overview:
A key component from the Structural Checking (SC) tool with Golden Reference Matching is the concept of assets. Assets provide labels to a signal about its purpose/function to the overall IP. For instance, a clock signal would be assigned a SYSTEM_TIMING asset because it provides timing for the whole system. A signal can have multiple assets to refine how it fits in the overall design. There are two main categories of assets defined in the SC tool, internal assets and external assets.
2) Internal Assets: Internal assets are intended to describe the function of internal signals in a soft IP, but can also be used for primary port signals. Most internal assets used in the tool were developed in [7] and [8] . In [8] three internal assets are added specifically for scan chains. These three assets differ from the rest of the internal assets because they need to be manually assigned to signals. Most internal signals are assigned automatically as the SC tool parses the RTL code. Some examples of internal assets include PROCESS_SENSITIVE describing a signal included in the sensitivity list of a process block and CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN describing a signal within an "if/case" block.
3) External Assets: External assets are used to describe the function/purpose of primary ports of a soft IP. Unlike internal assets, all external assets must be manually assigned to each primary port signal by the user, since only the user knows how this IP will be connected in the overall system. These assets are broken up into 5 main categories: Data, Timing, System Control, Specific System Control, and Miscellaneous. An example from the Data category includes DATA_MEMORY. This asset is assigned to signals that transfer data to or from any type of memory. COUNT is an example from the Timing category, and this asset is assigned to signals that keep track of a count value. An example from System Control is HANDSHAKING, which, when assigned to signals, handles any type of handshaking operations. An example of System Specific Control includes the COMMUNICATION_ CONTROL asset. It is assigned to a signal that controls transmission with another component (such as a UART). Finally, an example from the Miscellaneous category includes ADDRESS_SENSITIVE and is assigned to signals that connect to the memory addresses of an IP. The SC tool currently has 58 external assets available. 4) Asset Filtering: This allows assets assigned on any primary port signal to propagate through connected signals. By propagating assets, a set of rules determines whether or not the asset is copied to its neighbors. Upon the completion of asset filtering, asset traces are created for every port/internal signal in a design and contain all assets assigned to it [9] . An asset pattern is a compilation of all asset traces of a soft IP [5] . An asset pattern is broken down into six characteristics. External assets for primary input port signals are denoted as ">" in a GRL file. Internal assets for primary input port signals are denoted as ">*". External assets for primary output ports signal are denoted by "<". Likewise, internal assets for primary output port signals are denoted as "<*". Finally, external assets for internal signals and internal assets for internal signals are respectively denoted as "/" and "/*".
B. Golden Reference Matching 1) Overview:
The concept of Golden Reference Matching is to take an unknown soft IP asset pattern, compare it against an asset pattern of the Golden Reference Library, and then determine if it contains a Trojan based on statistical results. For each library entry, the algorithm calculates a percent match, which is used to determine the overall functionality of the design [5] .
2) Best Matching Process: Table I . provides a simple example of the matching process. Each row contains the assets assigned to a single signal from the unknown IP and assets assigned to a single signal from a GRL entry. In the first row the assets are identical, which gives a 100% match. Trace number 2 only matches 1 out of the 3 assets, which produces a 33% match. Finally, trace 3 has no identical assets between the unknown IP and the GRL entry, which results in a 0% match. These three asset traces come from the same characteristic which would result in a 44.33% match for that characteristic. The same process of matching is completed for the other 5 characteristics. After computing a percent match for all characteristics, the overall percent match is calculated by taking an average of 6 characteristics' percent matches. When calculating percent matches for each characteristic, there are special cases, such as either the unknown IP, the GRL entry, or both do not have any assets in a given characteristic. In these special cases, the characteristic is left out of the overall percent match calculation.
3) Partial Matching: In [5] , partial matching is added to the matching algorithm. Partial matching involves applying a 50% match between assets that are not identical but share a similar purpose. For instance, in the Data category of assets, there is a DATA_SENSITIVE asset that generically classifies a signal to be dependent on some type of data. Within this same category, there are assets such as DATA_MEMORY which are specific versions of the generic DATA_SENSITIVE asset. Consequently, the algorithm is altered to provide a partial match. For the same example in Table I , trace 3 now has a 50% match instead of 0%. In this case, the overall percent match for this characteristic is 61% instead of 44.33%. 
4) Golden Reference Library:
The GRL is a collection of soft IPs collected from Trust-Hub [10, 11] , OpenCores [12] , etc., categorized into various functionality groups. They are also labeled as Trojan-free (whitelist) or Trojan-infested (blacklist). Unknown IPs that match best to GRL entries with a "whitelist" functionality are given that same functionality and are considered as being clean. However, if an unknown IP matches best with a GRL entry that has a "blacklist" functionality, then the unknown IP is given the same functionality and flagged as potentially containing a Trojan. To 978-1-7281-5020-8/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE clarify the concept of the GRL, Fig. 1 provides an example of a GRL entry. At the top, the entity's name is provided, along with a breakdown of the type and number of signals used in the design. Then the file provides a labeled functionality which is "INTERRUPT_UNIT" in this case of Fig. 1 . The remainder of the file contains the asset pattern of this entry which is used for the matching process. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Asset Reassignment
The SC process described in Section II leads to bias that negatively impacts matching results. All designs in the GRL require manual assignment of external assets. Additionally, the library has continued to grow in the lifespan of the SC tool. As a result, designs from later stages of the tool's development were assigned assets that did not exist in earlier stages. Moreover, a new developer may not fully understand a design due to various reasons. Consequently, there has to be an abundance of generic assets assigned in this situation. As introduced earlier, the SC tool is able to handle matching generic assets to their specific asset counterparts with partial matching. However, this way of matching always reduces the percent match to 50% even when the assets could theoretically be identical but are not due to bias in asset assignment. In order to alleviate these issues, the idea of asset reassignment is added. When comparing external assets, the algorithm will perform a check on both the target IP's assets and the library entry's assets to see if one asset is a generic version of the other. If yes, the more specific asset is reassigned to the generic asset. For instance, if the target IP has a DATA_MEMORY asset assigned to a signal and is compared to a DATA_SENSITIVE asset from the GRL entry, then the target IP's asset is reassigned to be DATA_SENSITIVE. This replaces partial matching in the algorithm by giving a 100% match instead of 50% because the more specific asset has been reassigned. The process of reassignment does not damage any original intent of assets assigned because each reassigned asset keeps the same general purpose as the original assignment.
B. Statistical Weight 1) Overview:
As explained in Section II.B., the overall percent match between the target IP and a GRL entry is calculated by taking the average of the six percent matches from the six characteristics that make up an asset pattern. Equation (1) below illustrates this process with the six characteristics denoted as "A" through "F".
A drawback of averaging all percent matches from the characteristics is that each characteristic then contributes equal weight to the overall percent match. However, external assets provide more information to a soft IP's functionality because external assets offer more specific descriptions of how a signal functions within an IP. While internal assets do contribute to the signal's overall asset trace, they do not provide information on what function the signal provides.
Assessing Asset Quantity: A common practice in statistical analysis is to weight final results when working with a subgroup. That is either underrepresented or overrepresented relative to the size of the full group. For example, if the population of the Earth is known to be 51% female and 49% male, but a survey involving just a small group is made up of 60% male and 40% female, then the final results should be weighted. For soft IPs, there is no known number of assets that should be in each characteristic because soft IPs can be designed in numerous ways with the same functionality. Therefore, for each GRL entry, the weight was determined for each characteristic by taking the larger number of assets divided by the smaller number. After calculating individual sets of weights for each GRL entry, a final set of weights was determined for each functionality by taking an average weight for each characteristic.
The process of determining a set of weights for each functionality in the GRL proves to harm the overall percent match by matching target IPs to library entries that did not have the same functionality. This fact indicates that the number of assets in a characteristic provides no correlation to an IP's functionality. The idea of weighting characteristics is added to the matching process in order to account for the fact that certain assets provide more information to an IP's functionality. Consequently, the method for determining weight seeks to use data that reflect how well assets in the GRL are matching to the target IP as opposed to the number of assets. In other words, weight considers the quality of assets in the GRL.
2) Assessing Asset Quality: Assessing the quality of assets in the GRL focuses on the frequency in which each asset appears in the library. Matching assets that appear in all entries of the library provides little information regarding which entries are most similar to the target IP, compared to matching assets that only appear in a few entries. For instance, the SYSTEM_TIMING asset is commonly found in most library entries because most entries have some type of timing 978-1-7281-5020-8/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE component. On the other hand, the DATA_ENCRYPTION asset is more commonly found in entries with an ENCRYPTION_UNIT functionality but is not common to all entries. Therefore, the latter can provide more information about which entries are most similar to the target. With this in mind, weighting emphasizes the differences in frequency of each asset in the GRL.
In order to determine weight for the six characteristics described in Section II.A.5, the first step involves calculating the probability of each asset among all assets of the GRL.
Total # of GRL Entries (2) Equation (2) runs through all "n" GRL entries and either adds one to the numerator if the GRL entry contains the asset, or zero otherwise. If multiple instances of the same asset exist in the same GRL entry, only one is added to the total. The number of entries that contain the asset is divided by the total number of entries to obtain the probability that a GRL entry has that asset. Table II provides a sample GRL to demonstrate calculating asset probability. There are six unique assets defined in this GRL. The probability for SYSTEM_TIMING is equal to four divided by five because SYSTEM_TIMING is present in four of the five GRL entries. The probability for the remaining assets would be calculated in the same manner.
With the probability of each asset calculated, the next step involves calculating a weight for each asset.
As shown in (3), an asset weight is determined by subtracting its probability from one. This type of calculation is thus determining the probability that an asset will not be in a GRL entry. By assigning weight in this manner, assets that are not commonly found in GRL entries will have higher weights. After determining the weight for each asset in the GRL, one final set of weights for the six characteristics can be calculated.
Total # Matched Assets (4) Equation (4) describes how to calculate the average weight of the matched assets in an arbitrary characteristic. The numerator keeps a running total of asset weights for each asset that is matched within a characteristic. The sum of matched asset weights is then divided by the total number of matched assets in the characteristic to obtain an average weight. If the calculation shows that a characteristic has a relatively high weight, this indicates that assets matched within this characteristic tended to have higher weight. As a result, the assets within this characteristic are less common in the GRL. Therefore, the characteristic receives a higher weight relative to the other characteristics when calculating the overall percent match, since the assets within the characteristic provide a more unique identification to the functionality of the target IP. Equation (5) illustrates the final step in calculating the weight for an arbitrary characteristic, "char." The average asset weight of "char" is divided by the sum of all characteristics' average asset weights. The quotient is then converted into a percentage based on each characteristic's contribution to the total average asset weight from all six characteristics. As a result, characteristics with higher average asset weight are weighted more in the overall percent match calculation, which reflects the idea of weighting characteristics based on the weight, or quality, of assets matched. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
During testing, results from [13] are used to confirm the tool's capability to maintain correct classification with the enhanced matching algorithm. The tested IPs include RS232, Basic-RSA, and AES. In addition to these relatively smaller designs, a few microcontrollers were used to test the improved algorithm. Due to the fact that the current state of the GRL contains very few IPs similar in size to a microcontroller, the statistical based algorithm helps extract important asset matches to obtain the best classification for each microcontroller.
A. Examples 1) RS232, Basic-RSA, AES Modules: The RS232 Trojaninfested module used is RS232-T700, which contains a Trojan in its transmitter that produces a denial-of-service attack by forcing the transmitter's done signal to be stuck at 0. Both the original and improved matching algorithms correctly classify the transmitter as containing a Trojan and thus demonstrate the new algorithm still functions properly. The Basic-RSA module tested is a BasicRSA-T200. This module has another denial-ofservice Trojan which disables encoding on the transmitter and decoding on the receiver. Finally, AES-T600 is used, in which the secret key is discovered after a certain plaintext is read. Similar to the results of RS232-T700, both designs were correctly classified by both versions of the matching algorithm.
2) PIC16F84-T100: The benchmark PIC16F84-T100 acquired from Trust-Hub demonstrates improvement in the overall percent match using the statistical weighting method. This microcontroller is made up of two different types of memory (EEPROM and RAM), a watchdog timer, interrupt ports, and I/O ports. Once parsed by the SC tool, assets are assigned to the primary input and output ports. These ports, and their corresponding assets, are provided in Table III . After 978-1-7281-5020-8/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE completing asset assignment, the SC tool filters these assets to connected signals as described in Section 2.1.4. Finally, the matching process is carried out both with equal characteristic weights (no asset reassignment) and statistical characteristic weights (with asset reassignment).
Table IV provides the top five overall percent matches from equal weighting of the characteristics and no asset reassignment. Table V provides the top five overall percent matches from statistical weighting of the characteristics with asset reassignment. While statistical weighting did lower all percent matches, the overall results indicate better matching with GRL entries that are most similar to the target's functionality. The calculated weights for the characteristics when matching this microcontroller were 20.908 for "input external", 8.037 for "input interal", 26.276 for "output external", 8.156 for "output internal", 26.406 for. "signal external", and 9.345 for "signal internal". As expected, characteristics with external assets were weighted more due to the fact that they provide assets that produce a better description of each IP's functionality. Analyzing the results of Table IV , most GRL entries are within a few percentage points of the next best match. However, the results from Table V show greater disparity among the results, indicating that the algorithm provided more separation based on assets that are within each library entry. The "simple_pic" entry matched the most assets of high weight with PIC16F84-T100 which reflects the idea of matching based on quality of assets. This also proves the effectiveness of the statistical approach because the GRL entry that is most similar in functionality to the PIC microcontroller is indeed the "simple_pic". 3) MC8051-T500 Core:
The 8051-microcontroller core tested is known to be Trojan-free. The core is made up of control units for a finite state machine (FSM) and memory, an ALU (with several specialized blocks for computations), a serial interface unit (SIU), and a timing unit (also handles interrupt signals). External assets are assigned to the core's top module, "MC8051_core". Additionally, external assets are assigned to some of the core's internal signals because not all subcomponents of the IP are fully connected to the primary ports of the top module. As aforementioned, asset filtering is not able to fully define the signals of subcomponents without the manual assignment of internal signals. Once asset assignment completes, asset filtering is performed, and the matching process is done on the core using both equal weight and statistical weight for the characteristics.
When matching the top-level module, "MC8051_core", the equal weighting matching process determined the functionality of the core to be COMMUNICATION while the statisticalbased process determined the functionality to be INTERRUPT_ UNIT. The INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality comes from the "simple_pic" GRL entry. Matching the 8051-microcontroller with another microcontroller proves that the statistical algorithm finds a better way to match the top-level module. The 8051-core and "simple_pic" are still very different, which is reflected in the 50% match at the top-level. The next three control files in Table VI all match with functionalities that differed from expected. In theory, each design should match best with a CONTROL_GENERATION functionality because each is intended to generate control signals for the microcontroller. However, the GRL contains very few entries within this functionality, and the entries that do exist are related to program counters. The next few files in Table VI, starting from "MC8051_alu" and going to "dcml_adjust", are shown to be correctly classified as COMPUTATIONAL by both matching approaches. Next, "MC8051_siu" is a serial interface component of the microcontroller which confirms the correct classification of COMMUNICATION by both matching 978-1-7281-5020-8/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE processes. Finally, "MC8051_tmrctr" contains control signals for both timing and interrupt components of the 8051-core. Consequently, this design theoretically matches best with a TIMING or INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality. In the equal weight example, this component of the 8051 matches incorrectly with a REGISTER_FILE functionality due to the large number of data assets that inflated its percent match with register files in the GRL. On the other hand, the statistical-based approach extracted a better match with an INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality, which reflects the design's interrupt control signals. The low percent match in the statistical approach demonstrates that the best match is still different from the component of the 8051-core. 
